People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 (September)People v. Hoy, 2017 IL App (1st) 142596 (September) People v. Evans, 2017 IL App (1st) 143562 (August). Episode 413 (Duration 10:27) Defendant was 17 years old when he was given a discretionary life sentence, is he entitled to a new sentencing hearing?
People v. Holman Facts Defendant was 17 when he and a buddy burglarized a home and shot and killed the 82 year old woman who lived there.
Because he was five weeks from his eighteenth birthday at the time of the offense, he was not eligible for the death penalty. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, ¶ 9-1(b). Instead, he was eligible for a discretionary life sentence. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, ¶ 1005-8-1(a)(1).
Criminal History The Madison County circuit court’s probation and court services department prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI). The PSI included the defendant’s criminal history.
Defendant had a prior conviction for murder and one for attempt murder under his belt.
At age 14, he was adjudicated delinquent for burglary and placed on two years’ probation.
At age 15, he was adjudicated delinquent for three counts of criminal damage to property and committed to the Department of Corrections’ juvenile division. The defendant was paroled and then arrested for burglary three months later.
His parole was revoked, and he was returned to the Department of Corrections. The defendant was paroled again at age 17.
While he was free, Esther was murdered.
No Remorse “The defendant expressed no guilt for this offense or remorse for the victim, who was an 82 year old woman who posed no physical threat to him. The defendant’s history of senseless criminal acts of mortal violence toward others and lack of remorse for his victims indicates to this officer that the defendant has no predilection for rehabilitation.”
Neurological Impairment On an intelligence test, the defendant scored in the borderline or mildly retarded range. Prost attributed some of his performance to “neurological impairment.” Other tests confirmed that and indicated a high probability of organic brain damage.
He was diagnosed as mildly mentally retarded.
The defendant’s verbal intelligence indicated that he does have capacity for making a “socially appropriate judgment.”
Given Natural Life The appellate court noted that the defendant’s sentence was not unconstitutional under Miller because the defendant here was afforded a sentencing hearing where natural life imprisonment was not the only available sentence.
Defendant Pushing The Envelope The defendant appealed.
Defendant was pushing the envelope and asking that the Illinois Supreme Court create a categorical ban on juvenile life sentences.
Procedurally, this is a denial of a successive postconviction that is being appealed.
Law The United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const., amend. VIII.
Inherent in that prohibition is the concept of proportionality. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 59. Criminal punishment should be “graduated and proportioned to both the offender and the offense.” Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 18 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2463, and Roper, 543 U.S. at 560). When the offender is a juvenile and the offense is serious, there is a genuine risk of disproportionate punishment.
In Roper, Graham, and Miller, the United States Supreme Court addressed that risk and unmistakably instructed that youth matters in sentencing.
Roper Roper held that the eighth amendment prohibited capital sentences for juveniles who commit murder. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79.
Graham Graham held that the eighth amendment prohibited mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. Roper and Graham established that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing” in three important ways:
First, juveniles are more immature and irresponsible than adults.
Second, juveniles are more vulnerable to negative influences and pressures from family and peers than adults.
Third, juveniles are more malleable than adults—their characters are less fixed and their malfeasance is less indicative of irretrievable depravity.
Those differences lessen juveniles’ moral culpability and enhance their prospects for reform.
Miller Miller held that the eighth amendment prohibited mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit murder. Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. Miller does not invalidate the penalty of natural life without parole for multiple murderers, only its mandatory imposition on juveniles.
Montgomery In Montgomery, the Court held that Miller applied retroactively.
Analysis The defendant in this case did not receive a mandatory life sentence but rather a discretionary life sentence.
Thus, we initially must decide...
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